Controlled Query Evaluation (CQE) defines a logical framework to protect confidential information in a database. By modeling a user's a priori knowledge appropriately, a CQE system not only controls access to certain database entries but also accounts for information inferred by the user. In this article, we present a static (preprocessing) CQE-approach for propositional databases with an availability policy. The resulting inference-proof and availability-preserving database ensures confidentiality of secret information while guaranteeing availability of certain database entries to a highest degree possible. We illustrate the semantics of the system by a comprehensive example and state the essential requirements for an inference-proof and availability-preserving database. We present an algorithm that accomplishes the preprocessing by combining SAT solving and "Branch and Bound".
Introduction and Related Work
Controlled query evaluation (cf. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] ) aims at preserving the confidentiality of some secret information in a sequence of queries to a database. Not just plain access to certain database entries is denied (as traditionally based on an "access control policy") but instead a "confidentiality policy" is specified and information that could be gained by logical reasoning is taken into account. This is what is usually called inference control. There are several different approaches addressing inference control for example for statistical databases [11] , distributed databases [8] , relational databases with fuzzy values [16] and for XML documents [22] . In [13] the authors give a comprehensive overview of existing inference control techniques and state some of the fundamental problems in this area. Wang et al. [21] name two typical distortion mechanisms (in their case for online analytical processing (OLAP) systems): restriction (deleting some values in the query result) and perturbation (changing some values in the query result). In general, any method for avoiding inferences has an effect on the accuracy of the returned answers: there is a trade-off between confidentiality of secret information and availability of correct information; in order to protect the secret information, some (even non-secret) information must possibly be distorted. The above mentioned approaches are typically based on specialized data structures (relational data model, XML documents); Controlled Query Evaluation (CQE) however offers a flexible framework to execute inference control based on an arbitrary logic satisfying some natural properties. In this paper, we restrict ourselves to CQE with propositional logic; we construct an inference-proof database considering the original (insecure) database, a user's a priori knowledge, a set of secrets, and additionally a set of propositional sentences that should at best not be distorted in the resulting inference-proof database (while still retaining confidentiality of the secrets). In Section 2 we introduce the CQE framework and state the prerequisites assumed in this paper. In Section 3 we formalize the notion of an inference-proof and availability-preserving database. Section 4 shows a transformation of our problem to SAT solving and "Branchand-Bound" and presents an algorithm that computes an inference-proof and availability-preserving database. Section 5 concludes the article.
Controlled Query Evaluation
Basically, a system model for Controlled Query Evaluation consists of:
1. a database that contains some freely accessible information and some secret information 2. a single user (or a group of collaborating users, respectively) having a certain amount of information as a priori knowledge of the database and the world in general; the case that several different users independently query the database is not considered as the database cannot distinguish whether a group of users collaborates or not
The user sends queries to the database and the database returns corresponding answers to the user. To prevent the user from inferring confidential information from the answers and his assumed a priori knowledge, appropriate restriction or perturbation is enforced by the CQE system on the database side. In CQE on the one hand refusal is used as a means of restriction: to a critical query the database refuses to answer (i.e., just returns mum). On the other hand, lying is employed as a means of perturbation: the database returns a false value or declares the query answer as undefined although a value exists in the database. In this way, the CQE approach automates the enforcement of confidentiality: wanting to restrict access to some secret information, a database administrator just declares the secrets in the confidentiality policy; based on this, the CQE system computes the possibly distorted (hence inference-proof) answers. However, the database should be as cooperative as possible: availability of correct information should be maximized and thus only a minimum of answers should be distorted, while still ensuring confidentiality of secrets.
The notion of availability can even be taken further: In certain cases, availability of some database entries may be more important than availability of other entries. In such cases, the database administrator can additionally declare an availability policy. The CQE system then tries to return correct answers for the entries in the availability policy and favors distortion of entries not included in this policy -but still confidentiality takes precedence over availability.
CQE can be varied based on several different parameters (see [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] ). In this paper we focus on a complete information system in propositional logic with a known confidentiality policy of potential secrets and an additional availability policy; we use lying as the only distortion mechanism. Thus, in this paper a CQE system is based on the following:
• a (possibly infinite) alphabet P of propositional variables; formulas can be built from the variables with the connectives ¬, ∨ and ∧; 1 formulas contain "positive literals" (variables) and "negative literals" (negations of variables)
• a database instance as a finite set db ⊂ P that represents an interpretation I of the propositional variables: for each A ∈ P, if A ∈ db, then I assigns A the value true (written as I(A) = 1), else I assigns A the value false (written as I(A) = 0); this means that we consider a complete database (to each query the database returns either true or false) and only instances with a finite positive part
• the evaluation function eval *(Φ)(db) that returns the formula Φ (if it is evaluated to true according to db) or its negation (if it is evaluated to false): eval *(Φ)(db) = Φ if I |= Φ (with |= being the model operator) ¬Φ else
• a confidentiality policy pot sec as a finite set of formulas over P of "potential secrets"; the semantics is that for each formula Ψ ∈ pot sec, if Ψ evaluates to true according to db then the user may not know this, but the user may believe that the formula evaluates to false (that is, for a complete db the negation of Ψ evaluates to true according to db); furthermore, the user "knows" the confidentiality policy: he knows the specification of the secrets (but does not know a priori the truth values of the secrets according to the current database instance db)
• an availability policy avail as a finite set of formulas over P specifying important facts whose truth value (according to db) should preferably not be distorted; that is, if values have to be distorted to protect a secret, for a formula Θ ∈ avail the distortion should at best not change the value eval *(Θ)(db) in the answer to the user
• the user's a priori knowledge as a finite set of formulas over P called prior ; prior may contain general knowledge (like implications over P) or knowledge of db (like semantic constraints)
There are some restrictions on the user's knowledge. In this paper, we presume: prior |= pot sec disj (where pot sec disj := Ψ∈ pot sec
The first three requirements (a) -(c) originate from our system settings: On the one hand, we use "classical" logic (where contradictions imply any propositionincluding the secrets -and thus have to be avoided). On the other hand, when trying to model a real-world user, we have to admit that we can merely produce an approximation of human knowledge, and influencing a user's knowledge by technical means is impossible anyway; that is why we assume a closed system where the user's knowledge cannot be changed from outside the system and just be incremented from inside the system. We require (d) because if the user already knows a potential secret, we obviously cannot protect the secret anymore. Requirement (e) is an even stricter condition and is owed to the fact that lying is our only distortion mechanism: without it, the system could run into a situation where even a lie reveals a secret. To illustrate this, assume pot sec = {α, β} (for formulas α and β that are both true according to db) and prior = {α ∨ β}; to the query Φ = α the CQE system would return the lie ¬α, but this would enable the user to conclude that β was true (and he is not allowed to know this); thus, we require prior to fulfill Equation (1) . This line of reasoning also demands that the CQE system lie to every query entailing the disjunction of some potential secrets (see [1, 3] for more information). This obviously is a disadvantage of the lying approach that restrains its applicability: whenever an exhaustive enumeration of alternatives is known by the user although each individual alternative is specified secret there is no option left for lying. That is, in the lying approach, not all alternatives can be specified secret: there has to be one non-secret alternative that permits a lie. As possible remedies we propose to either use refusal as a second distortion mechanism (see [3] ) or allow the database to be incomplete such that a (non-secret) undefined value could be returned as a lie (see [6] ). Both options are outside the system settings assumed in this paper and merely stated here without dwelling on technical details.
An Example System
The following example shall clarify the system design. We have a database with Alice's medical records. The curious user Mallory wants to find out whether she is seriously ill. We use the alphabet:
Poor Alice is badly ill and her medical records (that is, the current database instance db) look like this:
Mallory has certain background knowledge about the medication. He knows that:
1. if a patient takes medicine A, (s)he suffers from aids or cancer
if a patient takes medicine B, (s)he suffers from cancer or flu
Expressing these implications as formulas, we have the a priori knowledge:
Apart from maintaining the database, the database administrator specifies the potential secrets; in our example, Mallory should not be able to infer the diseases cancer and aids: pot sec = {aids, cancer}
Obviously, queries concerning potential secrets (for example, the two queries "cancer" and "aids") should prompt the CQE system to return lies (in this case, "¬cancer" and "¬aids"). Moreover, if the answer to a query would enable the user to infer a secret, the CQE system should return a lie, too (consider for example the query "medB∧¬flu" whose correct answer would imply the secret "cancer"). As can be seen from these considerations, confidentiality of secret information is considered more important than a correct and reliable answer. Secret information has to be kept secret even at the risk of returning inaccurate information. Some database entries may be of more importance than others. For example, some medicine might have serious side effects or mutual reactions with other substances; that is why information regarding medication should at best not be distorted. In our example, the database administrator declares the availability policy:
This example will be continued in Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
Constructing an Inference-Proof Database
Given a database db, a confidentiality policy pot sec, an availability policy avail and the user's a priori knowledge prior as described in the previous section, we now want to construct a database db (representing a new interpretation I ) that is inference-proof and availability-preserving with respect to every possible sequence of queries the user may come up with. We demand the following properties for db to be fulfilled:
i.
[complete] db is a complete database with a finite positive part
ii.
[consistent] db is consistent in itself and consistent with prior
iii.
[inference-proof ] I does not satisfy any of the potential secrets; that is, for every Ψ ∈ pot sec: I |= Ψ iv.
[availability-preserving] db evaluates as many of the entries in avail as possible as db does; only a minimum of entries changes its truth value:
db contains as few lies as possible (with respect to the original database db); that is, considering the set of propositional variables P, the difference between db and db is minimal:
As for the completeness property (i.), we want db to represent an interpretation I that assigns a value to every propositional variable in P, but the value true only to a finite subset of P. The consistency property (ii.) means that we want to find an interpretation I such that all formulas in prior are satisfied because the user's a priori knowledge is fixed and we cannot make him believe inconsistent information; that is particularly, for every χ ∈ prior : eval*(χ)(db ) = χ.
As for the inference-proofness property (iii.), in the special case treated in this paper -known policy and lying -the user knows that the system lies when queried after a potential secret: for every Ψ ∈ pot sec: eval*(Ψ)(db ) = ¬Ψ. That is why we define the set of formulas:
Neg(pot sec) := {¬Ψ | Ψ ∈ pot sec} and try to find an interpretation I that satisfies all formulas in Neg(pot sec) in order for db to be inference-proof.
With the availability preservation property (iv.), from all interpretations that ensure confidentiality of the secrets, we choose one that maximizes the availability of important database entries. We give availability preservation (iv.) priority over distortion minimality (v.); however, if there is no unique solution with minimal availability distance, we consider distortion minimality as a basic background availability property: from all inference-proof interpretations that preserve availability equally well, we choose one that minimizes the amount of lies in db .
Existence and Finiteness of Solution Database
All in all we conclude that I has to be an interpretation (for the variables in P) that first of all satisfies the set of formulas prior ∪ Neg(pot sec), second, retains the truth value of a maximum of formulas in avail and in the third place contains only a minimum of lies with respect to the original interpretation I. Under the requirements (a) and (e) given in Section 2, such an inference-proof interpretation always exists. To prove this, first of all note that requirement (e) implies that pot sec disj is not a tautology. Combining requirements (a) and (e), we conclude that prior is consistent with the set Neg(pot sec). Thus, there exists at least one interpretation I satisfying prior ∪ Neg(pot sec). The solution database db contains all variables A having the truth value true (that is, I (A) = 1). The finiteness of its positive part is ensured by a restriction to a finite set P decision of "decision variables" and just computing a new interpretation I decision for these variables. The decision variables are all variables occurring in prior, Neg(pot sec) and avail.
2 For the set of variables Vars(·) occurring in a set of formulas, we have:
All other (non-decision) variables get assigned the same truth value as before: I (A) := I(A) if A ∈ P \P decision . This restriction to a finite set of decision variables is indeed possible because changing truth values of non-decision variables has no effect on attaining consistency with the negations of the secrets. It is also the best we can achieve for distortion minimality as the distance restricted to the non-decision variables is db dist |P\P decision = 0. The minimization criteria are met with a "Branch and Bound" approach.
A "Branch and Bound"-SAT-solver
In order to find interpretation I , we combine SAT-solving (for the completeness and satisfiability requirements) with "Branch and Bound" (for the minimization requirements). The database db representing I will be inference-proof and availability-preserving by construction, as we describe in the following.
SAT solvers try to find a satisfying interpretation for a set of clauses (i.e. disjunctions of literals). The basis for nearly all non-probabilistic SAT solvers is the so-called DPLL-algorithm (see [9, 10] ). It builds an interpretation stepby-step by assigning variables a truth value with the methods: 1. "elimination of one-literal clauses" (also called "boolean constraint propagation", BCP): a unit clause (i.e., a clause consisting of just one literal) must be evaluated to true 2. splitting on variables: take one yet uninterpreted variable, set it to false (to get one subproblem) and to true (to get a second subproblem), and try to find a solution for at least one of the subproblems Whenever a variable is assigned a value, the set of clauses can be simplified by unit subsumption (if a clause contains a literal that is evaluated to true, remove the whole clause) or unit resolution (if a clause contains a literal that is evaluated to false, remove this literal from the clause but keep the remaining clause). If there is only the empty set left (which is equivalent to true), the current interpretation is satisfying; however, if the clause set eventually contains the empty clause (which is equivalent to false), the interpretation is not satisfying.
"Branch and Bound" (B&B, for short) is a method for finding solutions to an optimization problem. It offers the features "branching" (dividing the problem into adequate subproblems), "bounding" (efficiently computing local lower and upper bounds for subproblems), and "pruning" (discarding a subproblem due to a bad bound value). For a minimization problem a global upper bound is maintained stating the currently best value. A B&B-algorithm may have a super-polynomial running time; however, execution may be stopped with the assurance that the optimal solution's value is in between the global upper bound and the minimum of the local lower bounds.
The Algorithm
We now describe the algorithm that computes an inference-proof database db from db, prior, Neg(pot sec) and avail by using SAT-solving and B&B. Listings 1 -5 show the necessary functions in pseudocode.
In this section, we assume that the input sets prior, Neg(pot sec) and avail are sets of formulas in conjunctive normal form (CNF). An extension to arbitrary formulas is given in Section 4.3. Thus, for now each formula can be represented by a set of clauses (each conjunct can be written as a clause c = [l 1 , . . . , l n ] for the literals l i in the formula). The clause representation of prior is:
χ j is the jth conjunct of χ} Analogously, C N eg(pot sec) is the clause representation of Neg(pot sec). In our example, we have:
As we build the new interpretation I step-by-step, each formula (that is, each clause set) is eventually simplified by subsumption and resolution. For the availability distance avail dist (as defined in the previous section), we have to count the differences between the original and the new interpretation. To be able to do this while still simplifying the clause sets, we add an "expected value" flag to each clause set; it is written as ∅ if the clause set is evaluated to true according to db, else it is written as { }. Thus the clause representation of the availability policy looks like this: 
If we now treat this data structure as a multiset (i.e., allowing duplicates in it), the availability distance of a database db can easily be calculated by counting the clause sets whose evaluation according to db does not coincide with their expected values (so-called "contradictory entries"). That is, the flag values are evaluated according to db once at the beginning; with them, the availability distance (and upper and lower bounds for it) can efficiently be computed at runtime without the need to re-evaluate all avail formulas on db. In our example, we have:
If eventually medA is assigned false and medB is assigned true, the clauses are resolved and subsumed such that C avail becomes {{ }(∅), ∅(∅)} with distance avail dist = 1 due to one contradictory entry.
We apply boolean constraint propagation and splitting of the DPLL-algorithm to find the interpretation I decision for the set P decision of decision variables having the properties stated in Section 3. B&B on the set P decision yields a binary tree; its maximal depth is the cardinality of P decision . That is, in the worst case, the search space has size exponential in the number of decision variables. However, the aim of the B&B algorithm is to prune branches in the search tree as soon as possible and thus reduce the size of the search space.
Each node v in the search tree represents:
• a (partial) interpretation I v of all the decision variables that already have been assigned a truth value by either BCP or splitting so far; the rest of the variables is undefined
• three local sets of clause sets C • an upper bound for the distortion distance db dist called max lies v , defined as the number of variables with different or undefined value in I v :
We also have a current global optimum I best (with the bounds max unavail best etc.) that stores the best complete interpretation found so far; it is however initialized with the partial interpretation of the root node (see Listing 1). Availability preservation takes priority over distortion minimality. If one of the pruning conditions is met, we can skip exploration of the current branch and backtrack to the next alternative branch to continue the search. The search is started in the root node r with an "empty" interpretation I r where all propositional variables in P decision are undefined (see Listing 1). This initial interpretation is then gradually expanded in each node v by:
• choosing a unit clause from a clause set in C as we want to minimize the number of contradictory entries in this set and satisfying those unit clauses could yield a suboptimal solution
• choosing a variable from P decision that is undefined in I v (the "splitting variable") and constructing a left and a right child node of v: in one child node we assign the variable the same truth value as in the original interpretation I and in the other child node we assign the variable the opposite truth value (see Listing 3); one child node is processed before the other one (e.g., according to a "best-first-search" heuristic based on a lookahead strategy or by preferring the value of the original interpretation)
After an assignment, the clause sets are simplified (see Listing 4). Due to subsumption, variables (so called "don't care variables") might "disappear" from the clauses: they are still undefined but there are no clauses left that contain them. However, these variables had no influence on the satisfiability of the clauses; due to distortion-minimality, they are assigned the same truth value as in the original interpretation.
Having found I decision satisfying C prior as well as C N eg(pot sec) v and having minimal distances to avail and db, we can construct our inference-proof database db as follows:
for all A ∈ P decision :
A ∈ db iff I decision (A) = 1 for all A ∈ P \ P decision : A ∈ db iff A ∈ db (that is I(A) = 1) 
An Example Run
We now present the search tree for our example (see Figure 1) . For the root node r we initially have: . This yields the partial interpretation I r (aids) = I r (cancer) = I r (medA) = 0; from this we compute the bound min unavail r = 1.
Next we split on medB: we construct the child nodes left and right and begin with I lef t (medB) = 1; the resulting bounds after simplification are: min unavail lef t = max unavail lef t = 1 Simplification also produces the new unit clause [flu]; with BCP on this clause we have found a complete and satisfying interpretation in this branch and we set I best = I lef t with max unavail best =1.
In node right we set I right (medB) = 0. We find that min unavail lef t = 2, but 2 >max unavail best ; this means, a solution better than the current I best cannot be found in this branch. That is why we prune this branch.
We found the optimal solution in the first branch: I (medB) = I (flu) = 1 and I (aids) = I (cancer) = I (medA) = 0; the transformed database is db = {medB, flu} with distance avail dist = 1. We have not considered db dist here as there is only one solution with maximum availability.
Optimizations and Extensions
First of all, a vast number of optimization techniques and splitting heuristics have been proposed for the basic DPLL-algorithm; for example, subsumption removal [23] , reduction of the number of clauses [12] or elimination of variables [19] . Such techniques can be employed to speed up the search process.
Furthermore, there exist several adaptations of the basic DPLL-algorithm to non-CNF formulas. For example, Giunchiglia et al. [15] apply renaming of subformulas by adding new variables (thus constructing an equisatisfiable formula in CNF for a non-CNF input formula) but propose to split only on the original ("independent") variables. Alternatively, Ganai et al. [14] introduce hybrid SAT for boolean circuits where only newly added ("learned") clauses are in CNF; propagation in circuits is supported by a lookup table and "watched literals" (see also [24] ). Thiffault et al. [20] also represent the non-CNF input formula as a boolean circuit and base propagation very efficiently on "watch children" and "don't care watch parents". In the boolean circuit approaches, new propagation techniques are defined for the different boolean operators.
The boolean circuit approaches seem to be the most promising when extending our algorithm to the non-CNF case for the following reasons:
• as we want to find a satisfying interpretation for all (now arbitrary) formulas in prior as well as Neg(pot sec), we can represent each formula by a boolean circuit and use splitting as well as non-CNF propagation techniques to simplify the circuits step-by-step
• as for availability preservation, we can represent each (now arbitrary) formula Θ in avail by a boolean circuit and maximize availability by minimizing the number of circuits that are evaluated differently analogously to our algorithm; we can also abandon the usage of flags and instead set the "top level node" (see [20] ) of the circuit representing Θ to eval *(Θ)(db) and count the number of inconsistent circuits for the availability distance
In order to give the database administrator greater flexibility when specifying the policies, instead of solving a SAT problem based on prior and Neg(pot sec) and a minimization problem with avail, we can extend the algorithm to solve a hierarchical SAT problem: while only prior is in hierarchy level 0 (and thus has to be fully satisfied), there can be other hierarchy levels consisting of alternating sets of confidentiality and availability policies that have to be satisfied as good as possible while lower levels take precedence over higher levels. This way, the administrator can specify fine-grained confidentiality and availability requirements of differing importance. In this setting, we can also skip requirement (e) (see Section 2) as we now solve a MAX-SAT problem for the negations of the potential secrets and not all secrets have to be protected. This approach has been published in a more generalized form for a hierarchical constraint solver in [5] .
Last but not least, if the number of changes in db (that it the distortion distance) is very small, it may be more efficient to just maintain a small separate database db , that contains all those entries of db that were added (as positive entries) or deleted (as negative entries) in comparison to db. db returns the truth values for all changed variables; the original database db returns the truth values for the rest (that is, only if db did not return a result).
Implementational Issues and Applications
Our approach can profit from existing SAT solver implementations, particularly solvers for the weighted MAX-SAT problem (where weights are assigned to clauses and the summed weight of the satisfied clauses is maximized). To benefit from the expertise of the developers of these solvers, we implemented a tool that translates the original database and the input formulas into a weighted MAX-SAT instance. As input format we use the TPTP (http://www.tptp.org/) syntax and take advantage of the variety of TPTP tools for translations into solver-specific SAT formats (e.g., DIMACS). Our tool has been tested with the solvers MiniMaxSAT (see [17] ), MAX-DPLL (Toolbar; see [18] ) and SAT4J (http://www.sat4j.org/).
We made test runs with relational databases of the following form: Each attribute has a fixed finite domain such that the problem can be fully propositionalized: a new propositional variable is introduced for each ground fact (e.g., pete_cancer for the ground fact Ill (Pete, Cancer)). We made test runs with domain size up to 2400 for the Name attribute, domain size 3 for the Diagnosis attribute and domain size 2 for the Medicine attribute. The propositionalized input database db consists of those propositional variables whose ground facts are included in the relational tables. Entries are permuted randomly in db.
The input clauses analogous to the propositional example (as for prior e.g., ∀x : ¬T reat(x, MedA)∨Ill(x, Aids)∨Ill(x, Cancer)) are propositionalized accordingly for all possible combinations (e.g., ¬pete_medA ∨ pete_aids ∨ pete_cancer) -yielding 9600 clauses in total. With the given domains, per Name value there are 24 admissable combinations of Diagnosis and Medicine values that are consistent with prior. We uniformly distributed those combinations in the database, leading to up to 4400 tuples in Ill and up to 2200 tuples in Treat. With MiniMaxSAT, solutions were found in less than a second.
Conclusion and Future Work
We presented an algorithm to preprocess an inference-proof and availabilitypreserving database based on a user's a priori knowledge and specifications of secret information on the one hand and (wrt. availability) important information on the other hand. While the worst-case runtime is exponential (in the number of propositional decision variables), there is a good chance to find an acceptable (or even optimal) solution in a smaller amount of time. We employed several state-of-the-art weighted MAX-SAT solvers that efficiently compute a solution database. Note that with the presented algorithm, even if we stopped the algorithm prematurely and accepted a suboptimal solution, this solution would be definitely inference-proof; it might only be suboptimal with respect to availability: not all important information might be preserved and there may be more lies in the database than necessary. Future work shall investigate how this approach can be adapted to other CQE parameters, namely, the unknown policy case, refusal as a restriction method and incomplete databases. Furthermore, this method shall be expanded to other logics (for example, first-order logic with an infinite underlying domain analogously to [4] ). Moreover, a comparison of the CQE system to existing approaches for general purpose databases (see e.g. [13] ) is in progress.
